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Abstract 
The division of Berlin’s infrastructure systems following the blockade of 1948/49 posed an enormous 
challenge to the city’s infrastructure planners on both sides of the political divide. This paper is a study 
of the destabilisation of apparently highly durable technical systems precipitated by the Berlin 
blockade and the subsequent efforts of those responsible to re-stabilise the systems. It investigates the 
different experiences of division in the electricity, gas, water and wastewater sectors with a view to 
raising our understanding of the durability and adaptability of urban technical networks in the face of 
major upheaval. In the immediate aftermath of the blockade, the paper argues, the prime concern of 
 2 
network managers in both West and East Berlin was to maintain essential services in the face of 
interventions and reprisals from the other side. As prospects for re-unification diminished, the strategy 
shifted towards reducing the vulnerability and advancing the territorial cohesion of each side by re-
ordering their technical networks physically, spatially and organisationally.   
Keywords: Berlin blockade, urban infrastructure, utility strategies, energy, water, vulnerability, 
resilience  
 3 
“These supply networks are like the internal organs of any living being. The life-
supporting internal networks of an organism are protected, just like the 
underground infrastructure of a city. Any disturbance endangers the functioning of 
the whole. Substantial interference in these internal supply systems poses a threat to 
city life in general.” (Prof. Ernst Randzio, in a speech to the Reconstruction 
Committee of the Berlin City Council, 16 May 1946)1 
 
1.  Introduction  
On 24 June 1948 the Soviet military authorities in Berlin instructed the city’s electricity utility 
Bewag, located in the Soviet sector, to cut off all power supplies to the three western sectors 
of the city. Deliveries of coal to power plants in the western part of the city were also to cease 
immediately. The following day the Soviet commandant dismissed Bewag’s technical 
director, Wissell, for refusing to follow these orders and for holding a press conference to 
protest against the blockade of West Berlin. The western occupying powers retaliated by 
stopping the transport of coal from the Ruhr to the Soviet zone and cutting off all supplies of 
gas from West to East Berlin. The sudden truncation of flows of electricity and coal plunged 
West Berlin into a supply crisis far more severe than anything experienced during the wartime 
bombardment and invasion of the city. Without adequate electricity the sewage pumping 
stations in West Berlin were rendered temporarily inoperable, leaving the utility managers 
with no option but to empty sewage untreated into the city’s watercourses, thereby creating a 
major public health hazard.2  
The Berlin blockade and the proxy Cold War over Berlin’s infrastructure systems pose an 
extreme, but also highly revealing, example of network disruption, the vulnerability of cities 
and the relationship between the two. We do not usually associate technical infrastructure 
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with disruption and volatility. Quite the reverse: “for most of us”, Jane Summerton notes, 
“technical systems conjure up images of stability and permanence”.3 This paper is a study of 
the destabilisation of apparently highly durable technical systems precipitated by the Berlin 
blockade and the subsequent efforts of those responsible to re-stabilise the systems – 
organisationally, technically and spatially.4 It investigates the experiences of division in the 
electricity, gas, water and wastewater sectors in both East and West Berlin with a view to 
raising our understanding of the resilience and adaptability of urban technical networks in the 
face of major upheaval. Here we follow Jane Summerton’s exhortation: 
“By studying phases in which technical systems undergo radical change, we might 
expect to gain new insights into basic dynamics and properties of these systems.”5 
In the case of post-war Berlin interest lies in exploring what dimensions of the infrastructure 
systems changed – and what did not change – in the immediate and long-term aftermath of 
political division. Conceiving urban infrastuctures as socio-technical systems comprising a 
“seamless web” of technical, organisational and soci-economic artefacts,6 we might anticipate 
different degrees of vulnerability, resilience and adaptability for each of these dimensions.  
To guide our story we pursue two lines of investigation. The first set of questions relates to 
the coping strategies of infrastructure managers in crisis situations. What were the initial 
responses of those responsible to the physical, organisational and political division of Berlin’s 
infrastructure networks? What longer-term strategies developed over time and how far were 
they directed at preserving the status quo or minimising dependence on the other side of the 
city? What do these responses tell us about notions of security and stability relating to large 
technical systems? 
A second group of questions draws attention to the complex relationship between a city and 
its infrastructure in periods of political conflict.7 In what ways did Berlin’s infrastructure 
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systems become tools of political division during and after the blockade? Did they, at the 
same time, prove a source of strength and stability for the two half-cities? If infrastructure 
networks traditionally serve as “integrators of urban spaces”8, what effect did their division 
have on the territorial cohesion of Berlin, both as a whole and on each side of the divide? Did 
the stabilisation of infrastructure systems in West and East ultimately jeopardise the future 
reunification of the city? 
To provide answers to these questions the paper begins by describing the various 
manifestations of political division for each of Berlin’s infrastructure systems (electricity, gas, 
water, wastewater), indicating how the dramatic events of the blockade affected flows of 
natural resources, people and information. The following section explores the responses of the 
infrastructure managers in West and East Berlin to the division of their socio-technical 
networks, distinguishing between emergency measures and longer-term coping strategies. 
These responses are subsequently interpreted in terms of the spatial re-ordering of the city’s 
infrastructure systems and the consequences this had for future reunification. Finally, 
conclusions are drawn on what the case study reveals about the interdependence of a city and 
its infrastructure and about the resilience and adaptability of Berlin’s urban technical 
networks in the face of long-term disruption. 
 
2.  Dividing the city, dividing the networks 
2.1   The political division of Berlin 
The building of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 – the most visible expression of the divided 
city – marked only the culmination point of a process of political division between the Soviet 
and Allied sectors of the city beginning in the late 1940s. Whereas flows of people and 
vehicles above ground were halted by the construction of the Wall, underground flows of 
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electricity, gas, water and wastewater had been truncated or severely restricted much earlier, 
during or after the blockade of West Berlin in 1948/49.9  
The story of the Berlin blockade does not need to be repeated here.10 For the purpose of our 
study we can summarise that the blockade was a calculated attempt by the Soviet Union to 
force the Western powers to sacrifice West Berlin, leaving political control of the whole city 
to the Soviet forces and its Eastern German allies. Failing this, the blockade would, at the very 
least, demonstrate the extreme dependence of West Berlin, located deep within the Soviet 
occupied zone, on the will and influence of the Soviet military authorities. The blockade 
entailed cutting off West Berlin’s road and rail routes from Western Germany, as well as its 
electricity supply, without warning on 24 June 1948. The Western Allies were faced with the 
choice of either allowing West Berlin to starve and ultimately capitulate to Soviet pressure or 
attempting to supply this city of over 2 million inhabitants by air. The airlift between Western 
Germany and West Berlin, established immediately, became the only line of provision of 
essential goods for the beleaguered half-city until the blockade was lifted in May 1949, almost 
a year later. During this time some 213,000 flights delivered an astonishing 1.7 million tonnes 
of goods to West Berlin. Some two thirds of this tonnage came as coal used primarily for 
electricity and gas production.11 The blockade disrupted not only flows of goods but also the 
fragile political unity of the occupied city. The Soviet authorities, once they had 
acknowledged the Western Allies’ determination to support West Berlin, set about dividing 
the city politically. By the end of 1948 Berlin had two city governments – for the East and the 
West. West Berlin thus became an “island outpost”12, isolated from its hinterland politically 
and economically, separated from the Allied zones in western Germany and deprived of its 
former functions as the capital of Germany. In the following section we examine how this 
process of political division manifested itself in the case of municipal services for electricity, 
gas, water and wastewater.  
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2.2   Disconnecting the networks 
Electricity supply 
Before the war electricity had been a far more important source of energy in Berlin than in 
any other German city,13 earning the city the title as “perhaps the most famous ‘electropolis’ 
of all”.14 The city’s power supply had been heavily dependent on the national grid, with the 
Berlin utility Bewag importing some 40% of its electricity in 1932.15 Astonishingly, most of 
Berlin’s own power plants survived the war.16 Of the 750 megawatts generating capacity 
available in 1944, 391 megawatts remained at the end of the war and a further 63 megawatts 
were only temporarily unavailable owing to destroyed power lines and coal shortages.17 Even 
during the height of hostilities, Berlin was without electricity for only 24 hours: on 27 April 
1945.18 Far more serious was the dismantling of power plants and removal of machinery by 
the Soviet military immediately after the war, conducted primarily in the western sector 
before the arrival of the Western Allies. The largest and most modern power plant in West 
Berlin – Kraftwerk West – was dismantled in its entirety. As a result, the generating capacity 
of the whole city was reduced by almost one half and of West Berlin by 90%.19 At the time 
the blockade began, therefore, West Berlin had already experienced severe disruptions to its 
electricity supply and was extremely dependent on power supplied by the power stations in 
East Berlin and beyond. Not only the generating capacity, also most of the city’s coal reserves 
were at the time stored at power plants in the eastern half of the city, notably at 
Klingenberg.20  
When the supply of electricity and coal to West Berlin from the Soviet sector and zone was 
abruptly cut off in June 1948 it thus plunged the half-city into an unprecedented crisis. The 
airlift set up by the Western Allies was devoted primarily to supplying the coal needed to 
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keep the power stations in operation. In a desperate effort to restore West Berlin’s generating 
capacity whole generators were flown in for the rapid reconstruction of Kraftwerk West.21 To 
minimise the strain on the power plant, the military and civilian authorities in West Berlin 
imposed severe restrictions on the consumption of electricity and gas for all but the most 
essential tasks, with punishments for infringements ranging up to a 12-month prison sentence 
in the British sector. In an impassioned appeal to West Berliners Ernst Reuter, then city 
councillor responsible for utilities and transportation, graphically illustrated West Berlin’s 
tenuous dependence on external energy sources: 
“Every kilowatt hour of electricity, every cubic metre of gas and every litre of water 
which is taken from our supply pipes costs coal. And new coal can only be provided 
by air.”22  
In the winter of 1948-9 West Berliners had on average only two hours of electricity during the 
day and two hours at night. Their per capita consumption fell as a result to a mere quarter of 
East Berlin levels.  
Gas supply 
In May 1945, following the wartime bombardment and the Soviet capture of Berlin, all eight 
of the city’s gas works were out of action.23 Of the 38 gas storage tanks, with a combined 
capacity of 2.1 million m3, only one remained operational at the end of the war, with a volume 
of just 160,000 m3.24 For the first time in over 120 years the city was temporarily without 
public gas supplies. Strict rationing of gas was introduced by the occupying forces, with 
heavy fines for infringements.25 Within two months, however, all but one of the gas works 
were operational and by the end of 1946 90% of the gas supply network and 50% of the 
production capacity had been restored.26 The blockade of 1948/49 resulted in the complete 
separation of the gas supply networks in East and West, as with electricity. The decision to 
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cut off gas supplies was taken, however, by the Western Allied forces in retaliation for the 
Soviet authorities severing electricity supplies. This reflected the reversed dependencies in the 
gas sector. West Berlin possessed around 70% of the city’s gas generation and storage 
capacity and was unwilling to continue supplying East Berlin with gas generated from coal 
which, during the blockade, had to be transported by air from Western Germany.27 The 
physical disconnections of the gas supply networks involved shutting the valves on gas mains 
on or near the border. Where there were no valves the gas transfers in each direction were 
calculated and (after lengthy negotiations) billed to the other side.28 By the end of 1950 the 
separation of the physical networks was complete: the service area of the West Berlin gas 
utility was henceforth almost wholly independent of the East. 
Water supply 
During the war Berlin’s water supply system, despite bombing damage, remained fully 
functional up until the Soviet military advance into the city. Even during the worst of the 
fighting in April 1945 water supplies were disrupted only for a short period of time and in 
certain areas.29 The immediate post-war concern was to secure sufficient coal supplies to 
operate the waterworks. As most water pumps were driven by diesel or steam West Berlin’s 
water supply was not immediately affected by the power cuts marking the beginning of the 
blockade.30 Nor were water services subject to the arbitrary or sudden cut-offs in supply 
experienced in the electricity and gas sectors – at least not during the initial months of the 
blockade. Prior to 1950 drinking water continued to flow freely between the two halves of the 
city. However, the dependence of areas close to the political boundaries on water from the 
other side became a source of conflict in subsequent years, as we shall see. 
Wastewater disposal 
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In contrast to the water sector, Berlin’s wastewater disposal system had been severely 
disrupted by the war. By 1945 aerial bombing had rendered all the city’s sewage pumping 
stations inoperable, allowing raw sewage to flow untreated into bombed-out sites and open 
watercourses. The effect on public health was dramatic: in the later war years mortality rates 
from typhoid fever reached pre-1870 levels.31 War damage had largely been repaired by the 
end of 1946, however. During and after the blockade the task of severing the sewer network 
was more difficult than with other underground infrastructures given the reliance on gravity 
and the diameter of the sewers. Blocking up sewers at border crossings would require re-
routing wastewater along alternative networks. Since there were 97 cross-border sewers – 66 
flowing from East to West Berlin, 31 flowing the other way32 – this option was neither 
technically nor financially feasible. An additional physical deterrent to separating the 
networks lay in the radial structure of the sewer network. Wastewater was collected at central 
points in the city and pumped out to irrigation fields or sewage treatment plants (STPs) lying 
largely outside the city. For this reason around 90% of West Berlin’s sewage was treated or 
disposed of on sites located in the surrounding Soviet zone.33 As with electricity supplies, 
therefore, West Berlin’s wastewater disposal system depended heavily on the will – and whim 
– of its political opponents.  
 
2.3   Splitting the utilities 
Parallel to the physical division of the infrastructure networks the Berlin blockade heralded 
the organisational separation of the utility companies in the two halves of the city. The 
division of the electricity utility Bewag began immediately after imposition of the blockade.34 
Between June and December 1948 a power struggle raged over control of the company and, 
in particular, of its headquarters located in the Soviet sector of the city. Interventions by the 
Soviet authorities to dismiss and replace senior company executives and to manipulate 
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representation on the Bewag workers’ council were countered by reprisals from the West. 
Bitter accusations and counter-accusations between the two sides succeeded in splitting the 
workforce along political lines. When pro-western staff walked out of the company 
headquarters on 6 December in protest at the dismissal of the Bewag director Strassmann and 
the appointment of the pro-Soviet Witte the split of Bewag into two companies was complete. 
The experience of the other utilities was similar. Early in the blockade the Soviet authorities 
gave orders for the headquarters of the gas utility Gasag, also located in East Berlin, to be 
occupied and communications with the company’s West Berlin offices to be disrupted.35 On 
26 March 1949 Gasag was split into two, at the same time as the water utility.36 The 
wastewater utility had already been divided in late 1948. Henceforth each service was 
provided by a completely separate company with its own headquarters in the respective half 
of the city.  
 
2.4   Disrupting knowledge flows 
Other flows of vital importance to the functioning of the city’s infrastructure systems were 
also cut off or redirected as a result of political division: flows of information, lines of 
communication and movements of people. During the struggles for control over the utility 
companies prior to their division, the military authorities on both sides attempted to prevent 
the movement of machinery, equipment and documents from plants or offices located in their 
own sector. The Soviet authorities, in particular, were concerned to stop staff sympathetic to 
West Berlin from smuggling important files, plans and maps from the head offices in East 
Berlin to the West. When the dramatic split of the utilities came, chief executives who vacated 
the central office buildings left only with what they could carry.  
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Since most documentary material was left behind in the East Berlin headquarters and staff 
from the West were denied access to it, the West Berlin utilities possessed wholly inadequate 
data about their own technical networks, hampering reconstruction work for years to come.37 
West Berlin’s Gasag may have possessed 70% of the city’s gas production and storage 
capacity but it had no plans or company records, no technical department, no store and no 
workshops.38 Bewag-West technicians had to reconstruct from memory the layout of their 
part of the network of underground cables. The water utility in West Berlin lacked adequate 
documentation on the water supply network and data on water consumption. Consequently, 
the engineers had to draw up completely new plans from scratch – a painstaking exercise 
which took around a decade to complete.39  
Some informal contacts were maintained across the political divide which helped fill some of 
the most urgent knowledge gaps on both sides. Such meetings between former colleagues 
were prohibited by the East Berlin utilities and had to be clandestine. These personal contacts 
tailed off, however, during the 1950s and were stopped almost entirely when the Wall was 
built. There remained subsequently only limited formal contacts between West and East, for 
example over contractual agreements for cross-border transfers or monthly meetings of senior 
technicians from the two power utilities.40 The knowledge networks had been disrupted so 
severely that by 1968, according to Richard Merritt, “directors on both sides of the 
Brandenburg Gate learn about plans of the other side only through the press”.41  
The division of the utilities and their staff affected not only information flows but also the 
skills and knowledge of the respective workforces. The general tendency in 1949/50 was for 
the more highly qualified and better paid staff to follow the West Berlin utility and for a larger 
proportion of workers to remain with the East Berlin company. As a result Bewag-West had a 
surfeit of office staff and not enough workers and technicians, whilst Bewag-East suffered 
from the loss of key management personnel, as well as retaining only two fifths of the total 
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workforce. The damage of division to the workforce of the utilities well preceded the building 
of the Berlin Wall in 1961, in other words, when the flows of people were arrested 
completely.  
 
3.  Securing the systems 
The political division of Berlin had, as we have seen, dramatic impacts on the territorial 
integrity, technical functionality and organisational structure of the city’s infrastructure 
systems. This begs the question how those responsible responded to this immense and unique 
challenge. Looking beyond the immediate events of division surrounding the blockade – the 
era of de-stabilisation – we now turn to the efforts of the network managers (utility executives 
and infrastructure planners) to safeguard and stabilise their systems within the new 
geopolitical reality of a divided Berlin. How did they attempt to reorder their infrastructure 
systems and what notions of security guided their thinking when rebuilding the networks? It is 
useful to distinguish here between emergency measures taken to secure immediate supplies 
and longer-term strategies for infrastructure development. 
 
3.1 Emergency measures 
The immediate concern for network managers on both sides of the divide was to secure 
essential energy, water and sanitation services disrupted by the blockade and the post-
blockade division of the networks. Attention focussed initially on arranging cross-border 
transfers in which energy, water and wastewater flows were allowed to pass from one side to 
the other at certain points in exchange for payments. Reaching agreement over the transfers 
invariably entailed protracted negotiations between the two sides. Until the flows could be 
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accurately measured there were frequent disputes over payments culminating in the more 
extreme cases in summary disconnections. Experiences of cross-border transfers differed 
significantly, however, between the various infrastructure sectors, meriting a closer look at the 
distinguishing features in each case.  
Electricity: Following the end of the blockade on 12 May 1949 West Berlin was keen to reach 
agreement on the delivery of electricity from East Berlin, at least until the reconstruction of 
Kraftwerk West was complete. A contract was duly signed, on 18 July 1949, and over the 
next year Bewag-West received 457,000 Mwh, or ca. 56% of its gross output, from East 
Berlin and the Soviet zone.42 Disputes over the renewal of this contract led to electricity 
supplies from East to West being summarily cut and restored as East Berlin exploited its 
powerful bargaining position to extract maximum concessions. A more stable arrangement 
was reached on 16 November 1950 involving a three-way agreement for Bewag-East to 
supply Bewag-West, the Hamburg power utility to supply Mecklenburg (situated in the Soviet 
zone) and Bewag-West to reimburse the Hamburg utility. The following months were 
relatively uneventful; indeed there were even cases of cross-border assistance following 
technical failures on both sides of the divide. In early 1952, however, the separation of West 
Berlin’s electricity network took a further decisive step. On 4 March Bewag-East announced 
the impending termination of all electricity supplies to West Berlin, citing “disturbances in the 
East German power system”. When offers of help from Bewag-West were ignored, the 
company had no alternative but to shut down the cross-border power lines. Richard Merritt 
describes the final act of separation: 
“Bewag-West did what it could. Its technicians took prompt action to recircuit 
Bewag-West’s own electrical distribution, thereby forestalling a failure of the entire 
system of West Berlin. Until past two in the morning they cut, circuit by circuit, the 
lesser transmission lines of the grid that bound the two halves of the city together.”43  
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Gas: Unlike the Bewag experience, contractual agreements between Gasag-West and Gasag-
East were generally adhered to. This may be attributed to the much lower levels of 
dependency of Berlin as a whole on outside supplies and of West Berlin on supplies from East 
Berlin. Even before the war Berlin had not been served by long-distance gas mains, despite 
intensive wooing by the national Reichswerke.44 Gas was produced from coal wholly at its 
own gas works. Nor was East Berlin in a particularly strong bargaining position, lacking 
adequate production capacity itself and – without access to Ruhr coal – dependent on coal 
from Upper Silesia that was less suitable for coking. 
Water: As with electricity generation, the water supply situation was strongly asymmetrical in 
favour of East Berlin in the late 1940s. In terms of the water resources theoretically available 
to city waterworks East Berlin possessed twice the per capita capacity of West Berlin: 
700,000 m3 per day for 1.2 million inhabitants (East) compared with 600,000 m3 per day for 
2.1 million inhabitants (West).45 Considerably more water flowed along water mains from 
East to West than in the other direction, tempting the East Berlin government to maximise 
compensation for the net water transfers to West Berlin. Protracted negotiations over the price 
of these transfers during 1949/50 ultimately broke down. Frustrated by the lack of progress, 
West Berlin officials disconnected all water mains linking the two halves of the city on 3 July 
1950. This “precipitous action […] by Western officials”46 had a far more detrimental impact 
on West Berlin than on the East, revealing the greater dependency of the former on cross-
border water flows at this time. The borough of Neukölln, on the border with East Berlin, was 
cut off from its water supply for days, prompting the West Berlin authorities to lay emergency 
overland water pipes from the neighbouring borough of Tempelhof. After three weeks an 
agreement was reached over payment for water transfers and the mains valves were re-
opened. Subsequent disputes over payments for water supplies led to less dramatic 
disconnections in April 1952 and again in 1957. The installation of water meters at border 
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crossings in 1953, permitting exact calculations of water transfers, helped reduce conflict 
between the two sides over this issue. In a memorable incident on 7 July 1953, just three 
weeks after the East Berlin uprising, officials from the West and East Berlin water utilities 
met on the Späth bridge between Neukölln and Treptow to successfully negotiate additional 
emergency water supplies for West Berlin following a particularly hot spell. Relations 
between the two were, from 1958 onwards, less prone to conflict as West Berlin gradually 
extended its own water supply capacity, reducing its dependency on the East (see below).  
Wastewater: Following the organisational division of the Berlin wastewater utility, 
negotiations over payments for the transportation and treatment of sewage from West Berlin 
in the East culminated in an agreement on 12 December 1950 for a fixed annual sum of 1.3 
million DM to be paid by West Berlin. This agreement remained in force until 1954.47 These 
payments for net transfers of wastewater were a welcome source of hard currency for East 
Berlin – and a constant reminder of dependency for the West Berlin utility. 
Looking across these experiences in the four service sectors, we can make three general 
observations. Firstly, the network managers were clearly driven by a strong sense of 
responsibility to keep the systems working. Notwithstanding the deep political rift between 
East and West Berlin and distrust between the utilities on either side, the network managers 
often gave good professional practice preference over ideology when system failure appeared 
imminent, as the 1953 water supply incident illustrates. As engineers, their problem 
perceptions were primarily technical, not political. As former colleagues of the same utility 
company, their loyalties to those they had worked alongside until 1949 often remained strong. 
Secondly, the very fact that experiences of disconnections differed substantially between the 
four service sectors suggests that network managers were not following a uniform response 
pattern determined by their respective occupying powers or city authorities but exercising a 
modicum of independence in negotiations with their counterparts, at least in crisis situations. 
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Thirdly, this variation in experience can also be explained in part by the different physical 
attributes of the sectors and degrees of asymmetry between resource needs and resource 
availability. In the case of electricity, where West Berlin’s dependence on the East was 
initially very high but where technical options for self-generation could be exploited, conflict 
escalated to full disconnection. In situations where access to resources was less asymmetrical 
(e.g. gas) or where there were major physical and technical limitations to redirecting flows 
(e.g. wastewater) the willingness to reach agreement was greater. 
 
3.2 Longer-term strategies  
How did this response modify over the following years as the status of political division 
became more entrenched and the prospects for reunification more distant? How far did 
emergency measures to forestall network failure give way to more strategic thinking, and to 
what end? To answer these questions we compare the responses of network managers in West 
and East Berlin from the mid-1950s onwards.  
West Berlin 
As the acute crisis of unpredictable disruption by the Soviet authorities receded in the early 
1950s attention in West Berlin turned towards more strategic ways of safeguarding the 
infrastructure systems. The priority here was, undeniably, to reduce dependency on East 
Berlin and the Soviet zone:  
“The experience of the blockade made West Berliners insist on complete 
independence from the East with respect to most of these municipal services.”48  
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A repeat of June 1948, when the vulnerability of West Berlin’s infrastructure systems had 
been revealed all too painfully, had to be avoided at all costs. To this end the utilities strove to 
expand network capacity as fast as possible.  
It was no coincidence, therefore, that one of the first acts of city councillor Reuter following 
the end of the blockade was to call for the reconstruction of Kraftwerk West as a top priority. 
The speedy delivery of material and equipment and the establishment of substantial coal 
reserves in West Berlin were designed to act as a deterrent against similar Soviet interventions 
in the future.49 By 1952 this flagship power plant had been restored to a capacity of 268 
megawatts, already providing the lion’s share of the total 382 megawatts at West Berlin’s 
disposal.50 As the generating capacity of Bewag-West grew, with extensions to other power 
stations in Moabit, Charlottenburg, Steglitz and Spandau, so did the company’s bargaining 
position vis-à-vis the East. Negotiations for renewed cross-border electricity transfers in the 
summer of 1953 resulted in a much more advantageous deal for West Berlin.51 By early 1955, 
within an extraordinarily short period of time, Bewag-West had become self-sufficient in 
electricity generation. Not requiring electricity imports from the East any more the transfer 
agreement was not renewed.  
As with electricity, the West Berlin authorities were keen to expand their own gas production 
and storage capacity. Using funds from the Marshall Plan West Berlin more than doubled its 
daily production of town gas at its new gasworks in Mariendorf between 1949 and 1954 – 
from 306,000 m3 to 700,000 m3 per day – increasing this further to 1.5 million m3 by 1960.52 
It also attempted to acquire a long-distance supply of gas from the Ruhr – without success. 
The third major project was to store huge quantities of gas underground in Spandau. 
Launched in 1977 and envisaging the storage of ca. 1 billion m3 of natural gas, this scheme 
did not come to fruition until 1992 (i.e. after the fall of the Berlin Wall) owing to protracted 
negotiations with Soviet and West German gas supply companies.53  
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The capacity of West Berlin’s water supply network was similarly insufficient to meet 
demand.54 West Berlin had relatively limited groundwater resources at its disposal and the 
network was dependent on a few large waterworks in the North-West of the city. The priority, 
as with electricity, was to raise supply capacity as quickly as possible. Major investments 
were made in building a new waterworks at Riemeisterfenn in 1955 and extending the 
capacity of the waterworks at Beelitzhof in 1953 and, in subsequent years, at the Spandau, 
Tiefwerder, Jungfernheide, Tegel and Kladow waterworks.55 A water mains repair 
programme reduced leakage substantially. The water utility also applied innovative 
techniques to increase drinking water reserves, notably extensive forms of groundwater 
enrichment. Already by 1953 dependence on water ‘imports’ from the East had been reduced 
significantly and contacts with East Berlin counterparts had become less necessary. Several 
cross-border water mains were opened merely to keep the pipes clean. By 1978 the supply 
capacity of West Berlin’s waterworks had increased by 227% against the 1949 figure.56 
Despite the rapid growth of water consumption in West Berlin between 1950 and the mid-
1970s parallel increases to supply capacity prevented disruption to water services.57 During an 
unusually hot summer in 1975 the utility coped without mishap. 
Interdependencies between West and East over wastewater were more complex. On the one 
hand West Berlin disposed of only 10% of its wastewater on its own territory, at the irrigation 
fields at Karolinenhöhe, making it highly dependent on the surrounding German Democratic 
Republic (GDR). On the other hand the GDR had a vested interest in avoiding wastewater 
pollution of lakes and watercourses downstream of West Berlin. On 2 October 1951 the West 
Berlin Senate, as the city government was now termed, presented an internal report on various 
options for rendering the wastewater system independent of East Berlin and the GDR.58 
Interestingly, the one chosen was against provisional measures designed to provide immediate 
relief for the critical disposal situation and in favour of a long-term plan for structural 
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autonomy. On the basis of this strategy the decision was taken in 1953 to build three 
completely new sewage treatment plants (STPs) inside West Berlin, at a cost of 87 million 
DM, of which 50 million DM were to be funded by the European Recovery Program.59 This 
scheme, which involved substantial re-routing of wastewater flows within the existing radial 
system, was implemented with the construction of the STPs Ruhleben (1957-63) and 
Marienfelde (1968-74). The third planned STP was never built. By 1989, when the Wall fell, 
only 28.3% of West Berlin’s wastewater had to be disposed of, or treated, on East German 
territory – a major reduction from the 90% figure 40 years previously.60 Between 1950 and 
1990 the West Berlin sewer network was extended in length from 1,414 km to 5,169 km and 
the number of connected buildings more than doubled.61 This major programme of 
infrastructure upgrading and extension, we should note, was not untypical of developments in 
the Federal Republic at the time. Growing recognition of the environmental cost of economic 
growth was lending additional weight to strategies of network modernisation. Where West 
Berlin differed was in the strategic and technical orientation towards greater self-reliance. As 
with the water, electricty and gas supply systems, the West Berlin wastewater utility invested 
heavily in new technologies designed to meet the city’s peculiar geography of insularity. The 
two new STPs incorporated special space-saving design features, the stormwater drainage 
system was expanded, including the construction of eight underground rainwater retention 
basins, and a novel technique for sludge incineration was introduced in the 1970s to permit 
sludge treatment within the confines of West Berlin.62  
These major infrastructure building programmes substantially increased the network capacity 
of West Berlin. Dependency on the East was sharply reduced and asymmetries of capacity 
were even reversed in some instances. As a result transfer payments from the West to the East 
declined significantly and – most important of all – the West Berlin authorities acquired 
greater control over their infrastructure systems. West Berlin’s strategy to maximise 
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autonomy via major network reconstruction and expansion did come at a price, however. The 
investment programmes were hugely expensive. The reconstruction of Kraftwerk West alone 
cost $30 million, the new STP at Ruhleben $12 million.63 Total investments in the West 
Berlin wastewater disposal system between 1950 and 1989 amounted to around DM 3,800 
million.64 Richard Merritt estimated in 1968 that the direct and indirect costs for increasing 
network independence from the East for all infrastructure sectors amounted up until that time 
to some $250 million.65 This price tab was picked up not primarily by West Berlin consumers 
– who paid charges for their municipal services comparable with West German cities – but by 
the Federal Government, in the form of subsidies, and international funding schemes. In other 
words the financial costs of political division for the infrastructure systems were internalised 
by the West German government and Western Allies as an expression of political solidarity 
with West Berlin. What the political price of West Berlin’s increased self-reliance was for 
Berlin as a whole will be discussed in the subsequent section. 
East Berlin 
The East Berlin utilities also planned to re-orientate their supply and disposal systems around 
the particular needs of their own political territory, despite being generally less dependent on 
the other side than West Berlin.66 However, the proposals of the infrastructure planners to 
repair, extend and reorder the technical networks were, for a long time, not heeded. 
Applications for funding from the state planning system fell on stony ground throughout the 
1950s and 60s, despite repeated warnings from those closely involved of the dire 
consequences of underinvestment for the condition of the physical infrastructure and the 
quality of municipal services.67 The high priority accorded to industrialisation and housing 
construction by the state planning system resulted in meagre funding for technical 
infrastructures.68 This hit the water/wastewater sectors particularly hard, reducing supply 
standards and system reliability. The supply capacity of East Berlin’s waterworks fell 
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significantly between 1949 and 1970, from 715,000 m3/day to 525,000 m3/day, partly owing 
to the contamination of several wells with phenol and coli bacteria.69 A decision made in 
1956 to build a new sewage treatment plant at Falkenberg was not implemented until 1963. In 
the 1950s, and increasingly in the 1960s, the water networks were subject to technical 
failures, such as mains bursts, significant drops in water pressure and malfunctions in sewage 
pumping stations and irrigation farms.70 As water supply capacity failed to keep pace with 
growing demand areas were subject to supply cut-offs and rationing. In the summer of 1970, 
when demand exceeded supply capacity by an estimated 50,000 m3/day, large parts of the 
centre of East Berlin went without water.71 At the same time as West Berlin was investing 
heavily in upgrading and reordering its technical infrastructure East Berlin’s own 
infrastructure was being starved of funds, causing the city to lose many of the comparative 
advantages it had possessed in the early 1950s. 
Only after the 8th Party Conference of the Socialist Unity Party and the announcement of a 
major housing programme in 1973 was higher priority given to upgrading the infrastructure 
systems in East Berlin.72 For the first time, substantial investments were allocated to 
improving wastewater treatment, resulting in the completion of the STP at Münchehofe in 
1976 and the construction of a new STP at Schönelinde in 1979-87. The sudden willingness to 
fund the STPs can be explained largely by the fact that the new housing estates were to be 
sited on wastewater irrigation farms, requiring alternative and – above all – space-saving 
forms of sewage treatment.73 Following the modernisation of East Berlin’s waterworks water 
supply capacity in 1980, at 810,000 m3/day, well surpassed 1949 levels.74 As an expression of 
growing recognition by the planning authorities of the importance of technical infrastructure 
to the city’s development, a general plan for the future development of all technical networks 
(Generalplan Stadttechnik) was adopted in 1980.75 Despite these improvements the repair and 
upgrading of the technical networks failed to keep pace with the needs of urban expansion and 
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growing demand.76 When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 most networks in East Berlin were in a 
chronic state of disrepair. 
 
4    New geographies of urban infrastructure 
The coping strategies of network managers in West and East Berlin were not geared solely to 
extending capacity in their respective territories but also, significantly, to rearranging the 
geographies of their infrastructure systems to their advantage, as far as this was physically, 
technically and financially possible. In the following section we interpret the empirical 
findings above to ascertain how spatially cohesive or disruptive infrastructure strategies 
proved in Berlin following political division. We begin by identifying three dimensions of 
spatial re-ordering characteristic of the utilities’ strategies. We then ask what consequences 
this had for the territorial integrity of Berlin as a whole. 
4.1    Selective territorial cohesion 
i.  Truncated spaces 
The truncation of electricity and water supplies created new infrastructure boundaries at the 
points of intersection between the two political regimes. Territories which had for decades 
been interconnected with cables, pipes and ducts transporting electricity, gas, water or 
wastewater were suddenly separated. Boundaries between the two sectors of the city and the 
Soviet zone, previously invisible from an infrastructure perspective, suddenly became areas of 
tension between two opposing regimes. Following the erection of the Berlin Wall in August 
1961 the East German authorities were keen to prevent the flow of people, not just natural 
resources and energy, from East to West. In response to a number of successful escape 
attempts through the city’s sewers, metal barriers were erected to permit the passage of 
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sewage but not of humans.77 Along the inner-city border physical connections were closed 
off, underground barriers erected and residual flows scrutinised to determine transfer 
payments. Behind the boundary between West and East each political system sought to corral 
its own infrastructure networks around the territory over which it had control.  
ii.  Consolidated spaces 
This reordering of the technical networks around the new geography of the city was not 
immediate but developed in intensity during the 40 years of division. West Berlin’s electricity 
supply system, cut off from the national grid and East Berlin, was reoriented around the 
political-administrative territory of the western sector, generating all its own power by the 
mid-1950s (see Figure 1). The West Berlin water utility created a completely new West-East 
axis to its water mains to compensate for the loss of supply from waterworks in East Berlin 
(see Figure 2).78 Similarly, the siting of West Berlin’s new STPs within the city limits – in 
Ruhleben and Marienfelde – was designed to redirect wastewater flows within the city, 
internalising wastewater treatment and minimising dependence on the GDR.79  
Figure 1: Location of power stations in Berlin 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Key to power stations (with today’s electricity generating capacity): 1: Reuter West (1987-) 600 MW, 2: 
Lichterfelde (1972-) 450 MW, 3: Charlottenburg (1900-) 385 MW, 4: Mitte (1964-) 380 MW, 5: Wilmersdorf 
(1911-) 280 MW, 6. Reuter (1928-) 232 MW, 7: Moabit (1899-) 151 MW, 8: Klingenberg (1925-) 180 MW, 9: 
Lichtenberg (1972-) 72 MW, 10: Steglitz (1931-2000), 11: Oberhavel (1961-2000), 12: Rudow (1963-2003) 
Source: Tepasse, Stadttechnik im Städtebau Berlins, 208 
 
Figure 2: West Berlin’s water mains network 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Source: Bärthel, Wasser für Berlin, 284 
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iii.  By-passed spaces 
East Berlin and the GDR, confronted with a significant ‘hole’ in their networks left by West 
Berlin, responded by reordering their principal electricity cables, gas pipelines and water 
mains so that they circumvented the western sector and targeted the new housing settlements 
on the edge of East Berlin, as clearly demonstrated in the Generalplan Stadttechnik of 1980 
(see Figure 3).80 The siting of new STPs in the 1970s in the new development zones to the 
East of the city is also indicative of spatial reorientation away from the old centre. In an effort 
to disentangle the sewer network close to the border with West Berlin the East Berlin 
authorities even built a number of so-called “border pumping stations” to redirect wastewater 
flows away from the West, primarily as a means of avoiding transfer payments.81 Besides this 
shift eastwards within the city, the East Berlin utilities drew increasingly on resources from 
the GDR at large. In the case of gas, East Berlin had been badly affected by the complete 
stoppage of gas deliveries from the West during the blockade (see above). Following 
unsuccessful attempts to meet growing demand by producing gas from coal in municipal 
gasworks, the strategy shifted to increasing the delivery of natural gas supplied long-distance 
from the Soviet Union.82 In the case of electricity, East Berlin also relied increasingly on 
external sources, in the form of power supplied from the Lausitz and Bitterfeld coalfields in 
the GDR.83 
Figure 3: East Berlin’s water mains network 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
Source: Bärthel, Wasser für Berlin, 228 
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4.2   The price of territorial reorientiation 
These strategies of infrastructural separation and reorientation were promoted on both sides of 
the divide as a means of protecting their own territorial integrity. The notion of infrastructure 
as a force for spatial cohesion and urban development was retained, but the spatial terms of 
reference were the newly truncated territorial units, not the city as a whole. Infrastructure 
development was used, as we have seen, as an instrument of political and economic security 
as well as service provision. The idea that the reordered geography of Berlin’s infrastructure 
systems could have long-term negative impacts on the future development of the city as a 
whole was given relatively little consideration at the time, as the American political scientist 
Richard Merritt discovered in interviews conducted with network managers during the 
1960s.84   
Merritt himself was concerned about the irreversibility of the changes to Berlin’s 
infrastructure systems and the risks this posed for the potential reunification of the two half-
cities at some time in the future: 
“The infrastructural aspects of a political community […] exhibit remarkable 
durability and tenacity in resisting change. The very tenacity of the infrastructure, 
however, suggests that, once change is initiated, its reversal will be very difficult. 
The developments [in post-war Berlin] thus portend an ever growing divergence of 
West and East Berlin, respectively, from the old centre of Greater Berlin, and 
increased solidification of each around its new core area.”85  
Infrastructure planners did share these concerns and, especially in the early years of division, 
gave some consideration to possible reunification.86 However, the risk of establishing 
structures which might be difficult to reorder following any reunification was generally 
deemed less significant at the time than the danger of not being able to safeguard essential 
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services. Minimising dependence on the other side of the city was accorded a much higher 
priority than keeping the reunification option open. Merritt criticised West Berlin’s network 
managers for paying lip service to reunification while “enhancing the city’s invulnerability to 
threats to its independence”.87 He charged both sides with “pass[ing] up chances for fruitful 
cooperation – primarily for the sake of increasing the viability of the utilities in their own 
sectors”.88  
Merritt painted a picture of divergent pathways between East and West driving a rift between 
the two sets of infrastructure systems which reduced the prospects for their reunification. He 
was certainly correct in arguing how the two sets of infrastructure systems became 
increasingly self-dependent during the decades of political division. He was also right in 
demonstrating that this divergence was not limited to the technical/physical dimensions of 
infrastructure systems but also to their organisational structures and institutional 
arrangements. The West Berlin utilities were responsible to the city government but had 
considerable autonomy over investment plans and operative management. In addition, as we 
have seen, they received significant funding from the city, the Federal government and the 
international donor community. By contrast, the East Berlin utilities were institutionally weak 
and continuously under-funded. They came under the powerful influence first of the Soviet 
authorities and subsequently of the state planning bodies and suffered at least until the 1970s 
from the low priority accorded to infrastructure refurbishment in the state planning system. 
Yet the thesis of divergent, even irreconcilable, pathways is only partly accurate. If we look 
closer at the strategies pursued by network managers in West and East and at the underlying 
rationales for their actions we can detect one powerful parallel. On both sides of the divide the 
network managers were intent on repairing, modernising and expanding their technical 
networks to meet rising demand. Their prime concern was to ensure maximum connection to 
municipal services, adequate supplies of electricity, gas and water for all consumers at all 
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times and failure-free operation of the networks. Network managers in West and East Berlin 
followed the same supply-oriented logic of infrastructure management which their 
predecessors had pursued since the late 19th century. The results may have been very 
different, but this can largely be attributed to asymmetries in the availability of financial 
resources. The rationales motivating the network managers and guiding their strategies were, 
essentially, the same. 
The experience of reunifying the infrastructure systems of West and East Berlin after 1990 
would also suggest that the legacy of division was not as deep as it appeared at the time.89 
Technically, the networks were reconnected and barriers removed within weeks of the fall of 
the Berlin Wall. Organisationally, the amalgamation of the utility companies from West and 
East was complete within a few years. Financially, huge investment programmes during the 
1990s permitted the rapid modernisation and expansion of the East Berlin plant and networks. 
Here, again, the supply-oriented logic proved an important uniting factor. Whatever the 
difficulties encountered in the reunification process, the idea of bringing East Berlin’s 
infrastructures up to the standards enjoyed by West Berlin was a vision which all could share. 
The negative legacy which the period of division did leave was, ironically, a problem of over-
capacity. Having struggled to maintain services in two truncated territorial units, the strategy 
of both sides to build up their own, largely self-dependent infrastructure systems meant that, 
when they were rejoined in 1990, there quickly proved to be too many power stations, sewage 
treatment plants, waterworks and gasworks. As the population of the reunited Berlin has 
failed to grow according to expectations and consumption of water, in particular, has dropped 
sharply, Berlin’s utility managers today are confronted with the unusual phenomenon of 
under-utilised networks and surplus plant. 
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5.    Conclusions 
What conclusions can we draw from our analysis of the division of Berlin’s infrastructure 
systems following the blockade of 1948/49? One set of observations relates to the nature of 
the crisis and the interdependence between the city and its infrastructure which it revealed. 
The network disruption which Berlin’s infrastructure systems suffered in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s was not the result of forces endogenous to them but of the geopolitical conflict of 
the Cold War, with Berlin as the principal pawn. Technical networks played a central role in 
this proxy conflict. Severing West Berlin’s electricity supply was one of the first acts of the 
blockade, deliberately chosen to destabilise a city largely dependent on outside supplies. 
Subsequently, municipal services for gas, water and wastewater on both sides of the city were 
seriously disrupted by physical disconnections, political disputes and tenuous transfer 
agreements. Beyond the flows of energy and water the division of the city stopped or curtailed 
other flows of central importance to their functioning, most notably of people, equipment and 
information. The infrastructure systems became not merely targets but also tools of political 
division enrolled in the protection of one political regime against the other, creating structures 
of supply and disposal crucial to the survival of each part of the city. New geographies of 
infrastructure provision emerged to advance the territorial cohesion of each side, characterised 
by the spatial re-ordering of the technical networks and – in West Berlin’s case – huge 
financial support from the West.  
A second set of conclusions addresses the responses of the network managers to this crisis and 
the security concerns which these responses reveal. We have observed how, during the early 
period of the blockade and political division, the prime concern of the network managers, 
above all in West Berlin, was to maintain essential services in the face of interventions and 
reprisals from the other side. Emergency measures were targeted at ensuring the provision of 
basic – if heavily restricted – supplies of electricity, gas and water. The extraordinary degree 
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to which they succeeded in keeping the systems going in the face of frequent imminent 
collapse makes this a remarkable story of infrastructure resilience.  
In the longer term the experience of the blockade and the extreme dependence on external 
forces which it highlighted prompted West Berlin’s authorities to seek to maximise self-
dependence for all municipal services. The response shifted rapidly from stop-gap measures 
to network modification. This strategy gradually came to be mirrored in East Berlin, but only 
when sufficient financial resources become available from the 1970s onwards. Restructuring 
the technical networks to reduce vulnerability and creating sufficient reserves to withstand 
external intervention became the top priority for both sides. This strategy took clear 
precedence over concerns at the negative consequences which restructuring might have on 
any future reunification of the city and its infrastructure systems.  
In terms of the long-term legacy of division to Berlin’s infrastructure systems, experience 
since reunification in 1990 suggests the rift did not run as deep as some commentators feared 
at the time. The traditional, supply-oriented logic of infrastructure management persisted on 
both sides of the city, even though financial and political constraints in East Berlin did not 
allow it to bear fruit until the 1970s, and was instrumental in easing the process of reuniting 
the utility companies after 1990. In retrospect, we can also see that the physical and technical 
reordering of the infrastructure systems during the decades of division, although radical and 
unconventional, did not prevent subsequent reintegration in the 1990s. The changes to 
Berlin’s infrastructure systems during the 40 years of division constituted an adaptation of 
existing systems to accommodate new geopolitical realities, not a complete transformation. 
The principal negative legacy of division proved to be the infrastructural over-capacities 
generated for the reunited city, the product of the strategy on both sides of the divide to 
maximise capacity for their own territory. 
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